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Abstract
This paper offers a comparative analysis of official dis-
course surrounding three incidents of asylum seekers arriv-
ing in Canada by boat: the Komagata Maru in 1914; the 
Sri Lankans who arrived in Newfoundland on lifeboats 
in 1986; and the Ocean Lady in 2009 . The objective is to 
assess Canada’s commitment to protecting refugees at 
these three points in history and evaluate academic con-
tentions that the concept of the refugee is being eroded . The 
selected incidents trace the emergence and decline of the 
notion of the refugee in Canadian official discourse . Even 
during the peak of Canada’s commitment to refugees in the 
1980s, the discourse reveals blurriness between the ideas of 
the “refugee” and the “illegal migrant .” However, the char-
acterization of asylum seekers as “illegals” is more intense 
now than in the earlier periods . This shift in the discourse 
warrants attention as we face the prospect of what Audrey 
Macklin describes as the “discursive disappearance of the 
refugee .”
Résumé
Le présent article propose une analyse comparative du dis-
cours officiel entourant trois cas de demandeurs d’asile 
arrivant par bateau au Canada : l’incident du Komagata 
Maru en 1914, les Sri-Lankais qui sont arrivés à Terre-
Neuve sur des embarcations de sauvetage en 1986 et l’in-
cident du Ocean Lady en 2009 . L’objectif est d’évaluer 
l’engagement du Canada à protéger les réfugiés à ces trois 
moments de l’histoire et d’évaluer les arguments théori-
ques voulant une érosion de la notion de réfugié . Les inci-
dents choisis suivent l’émergence et le déclin de la notion 
de réfugié dans le discours officiel canadien . Même au plus 
fort de l’engagement du Canada envers les réfugiés dans 
les années 1980, le discours se révèle flou sur les notions 
de « réfugié » et de « migrant clandestin » . Cependant, la 
caractérisation des demandeurs d’asile comme « clandes-
tins » est plus intense aujourd’hui que par les périodes 
antérieures . Ce changement dans le discours justifie qu’on 
y porte attention alors que nous faisons face à la perspec-
tive de ce que Audrey Macklin décrit comme la « dispari-
tion discursive du réfugié » .
Introduction
In Humanitarianism, Identity, and Nation: Migration Laws 
of Australia and Canada, Catherine Dauvergne argues that 
Canada has an international reputation as a country with 
generous immigration laws and a history of offering pro-
tection to refugees . Contemporary Canada, says Dauvergne, 
has to some extent been “created” by immigration and 
the mythology of immigration forms an integral part of 
Canada’s national identity .1 Compared to other “immigrant 
nations,” such as Australia, Canada has a strong tradition 
of granting protection to those who meet the definition of 
“refugee” in the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (hereafter the Refugee Convention) .2 This tradition, 
says Dauvergne, is linked to humanitarianism, which is a 
value that Canadians as individuals are willing to honour by 
upholding the country’s commitment to provide asylum to 
those fleeing persecution .3
In recent years, however, immigration and refugee schol-
ars have observed that Canada is becoming more hostile to 
asylum seekers than it was in the past .4 In “Disappearing 
Refugees: Reflections on the Canada-U .S . Safe Third 
Country Agreement,” Audrey Macklin argues that the very 
concept of the refugee is being eroded in Canadian society 
and replaced with the image of the illegal migrant . Macklin 
explains that this “discursive disappearance of the refugee” 
is propelled by growing concerns about national security 
and the rise in interdiction measures . As developed coun-
tries like Canada make it more difficult for asylum seekers 
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to enter their territories, individuals fleeing persecution are 
forced to cross borders secretly, often with the assistance 
of human smugglers, in order to avoid being detected by 
authorities . Macklin notes that while it is widely recognized 
that millions of people are living in situations that would 
make them eligible for refugee protection under Canadian 
law, as soon as they cross the Canadian border they become 
illegals . Unlike refugees, who have a right to make a claim 
for protection, illegals are transgressors who are perceived 
as unworthy of Canada’s compassion .5
Dauvergne similarly argues that Canada has played a part 
in transforming refugees into illegals in spite of its humani-
tarian tradition . Like Macklin, Dauvergne links this process 
to concerns about security risks and the intensification of 
border control . She argues that when refugees are reconcep-
tualized as illegals, they are viewed as criminals, and thus 
do not trigger the same discursive responses that refugees 
have in recent history . Dauvergne reflects that while the late 
twentieth century was marked by the emergence of a com-
mitment to humanitarianism, the twenty-first century may 
be marked by the rise of border control .6
In this paper, I assess the validity of Macklin’s and 
Dauvergne’s observations by analyzing the official dis-
course surrounding three incidents in which asylum seek-
ers entered Canadian territory by boat . The objective of 
the analysis is to assess Canada’s commitment to the cause 
of refugees at these three points in history and evaluate 
whether the idea of the refugee is in fact being eroded and 
replaced with the concept of the illegal immigrant .
Incidents involving refugees arriving by boat tend to 
elicit strong public and political responses in comparison 
to refugees who arrive by other modes of transportation . 
Commentators note that refugees who arrive by boat gain 
a disproportionate amount of media attention, considering 
that they represent only a small percentage of asylum seek-
ers who enter Canada by illegal means in order to make a 
claim for protection .7 There is something evocative about 
the image of asylum seekers arriving by boat that attracts 
peoples’ attention and generates discussion among public 
officials about the country’s immigration and refugee poli-
cies . For this reason, the arrivals of refugees by boat offer 
material for a discursive analysis of Canada’s commitment 
to refugees .
Although asylum seekers have travelled to Canada by 
boat on a number of occasions, I will limit my analysis to 
the following three incidents: the Komagata Maru, which 
arrived in British Columbia carrying 376 migrants from 
British-controlled India in 1914; the two lifeboats carrying 
155 Sri Lankan Tamils who were rescued off the coast of 
Newfoundland in 1986; and the Ocean Lady, which arrived 
in British Columbia carrying 76 Sri Lankan Tamils in 2009 . 
I have selected these three incidents because they attracted 
a significant amount of media attention and generated 
political discussion . These incidents also share a common 
feature in that they involve asylum seekers of South Asian 
origin . Therefore, differences between the official discourses 
surrounding each of the incidents cannot be attributed to 
the asylum seekers’ ethnicities .
I chose the 1914 Komagata Maru incident as my start-
ing point because it provides a picture of how Canada 
responded to asylum seekers prior to the coming into force 
of the Refugee Convention . The official discourse surround-
ing this event thus illustrates how Canada perceived asylum 
seekers before the legal concept of the refugee came into 
existence . I selected the 1986 incident because it took place 
after Canada became a signatory to the Refugee Convention 
and during a period which is now regarded as the heyday 
of Canadian refugee policy . The year 1986 was the year in 
which the United Nations awarded Canada the Nansen 
medal in recognition of its commitment to protecting refu-
gees . In the preceding ten-year period, Canada had brought 
over 150,000 refugees to be resettled in Canada, which was 
more per capita than any other country .8 The official dis-
course surrounding this incident exemplifies how Canada 
conceptualized the refugee during the height of the coun-
try’s commitment to protecting those fleeing from perse-
cution . For the third incident, I selected the arrival of the 
Ocean Lady in 2009 because it is the most recent high-pro-
file incident involving refugees coming to Canada by boat . 
The Ocean Lady incident thus provides an opportunity to 
consider the current state of Canada’s commitment to refu-
gees . With the two earlier incidents as points of reference, I 
assess whether the official discourse surrounding the Ocean 
Lady indicates that Canada is becoming more hostile to asy-
lum seekers, and whether the notion of the refugee is being 
eroded .
Another reason why I selected these three incidents is 
that they all involve individuals fleeing circumstances of 
widespread persecution in their home countries . In 1914, the 
British-controlled Indian government persecuted Indian 
citizens who were involved, or perceived to be involved, in 
the movement for Indian independence . Several of the pas-
sengers of the Komagata Maru were in fact persecuted on 
this basis when the Canadian government forced them to 
return to India . It is therefore likely that they came to Canada 
with a well-founded fear of persecution . For this reason, it 
is appropriate to include the arrival of the Komagata Maru 
in this analysis of Canada’s commitment to protecting refu-
gees even though the event predates the coming into force of 
the Refugee Convention .
The second and third incidents both involve the arrival 
of Sri Lankan Tamils during a period when Tamils suffered 
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widespread persecution at the hands of the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment due to their ethnicity and their real or perceived 
involvement in the movement for an independent Tamil 
state . This persecution has been especially prevalent since 
the beginning of the Sri Lankan civil war in 1983 .9 Though 
the war technically ended in May of 2009, several months 
before the arrival of the Ocean Lady, reports indicate that 
the Sri Lankan government has continued to persecute 
Tamils . For example, the government has kept emergency 
legislation in place that permits warrantless searches and 
extended detentions of Tamils without criminal charges .10 
Given this context, it is likely that the Tamils who came to 
Canada by boat in 1986 and in 2009 had a well-founded fear 
of persecution .
Outline and Methodology
In Parts I, II, and III of this paper, I detail the events of 
the Komagata Maru incident, the 1986 incident, and the 
Ocean Lady incident . In each section, I discuss the official 
discourse surrounding the events focusing on public and/
or intragovernmental statements by the key politicians who 
were responsible for immigration at the relevant time . My 
aim was to find out what the officials said about the inci-
dents, how they characterized the asylum seekers, and how 
they related the incidents to broader immigration and refu-
gee policy issues .
In Part I, I draw exclusively upon secondary sources 
that provide historical accounts of the Komagata Maru 
incident . The officials whose statements I discuss include: 
Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden; Malcolm Reid, head of 
the Vancouver immigration agency; and E . Blake Robertson, 
Assistant Superintendent of Immigration .
In Part II, I draw upon secondary sources as well as 
newspaper articles about the 1986 incident . I identified the 
newspaper articles with Canadian Newsstand, which is 
a ProQuest database of nine major Canadian daily news-
papers . The officials whose statements I discuss include: 
Prime Minister Brian Mulroney; Benoît Bouchard, Minister 
of Employment and Immigration; and Gerry Weiner, 
Minister of State for Immigration .
In Part III, the section on the Ocean Lady incident, I 
draw on newspaper articles located through Canadian 
Newsstand as well as Hansard . In this section of the paper, 
I focus primarily on official statements by Jason Kenney, 
Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, because he was 
the government’s primary spokesperson regarding the inci-
dent . However, I also include statements by Peter Van Loan, 
Minister of Public Safety, and Members of Parliament, such 
as MP Don Davies (Vancouver Kingsway, NDP), and MP 
Thierry St-Cyr (Jeanne-Le Ber, BQ), in order to provide a 
broader picture of the discourse surrounding the incident .
In the final section of the paper, I provide a comparative 
analysis of the official discourse surrounding each of the 
three incidents . I reflect on the differences and similarities 
between the statements and explore how the statements 
reflect Canada’s stance toward asylum seekers at the three 
different points in history . In closing, I assess the extent to 
which my research indicates that Canada is becoming more 
hostile to refugees than it was in the past .
Part I. The Komagata Maru Incident
On May 23, 1914, a ship by the name of Komagata Maru 
arrived in British Columbia carrying 376 prospective immi-
grants from India . At the time, Canadian immigration 
laws included exclusionary provisions aimed at preventing 
Asians from immigrating to Canada . As a consequence, gov-
ernment officials refused to allow the passengers to land and 
forced them to return to India where they faced persecution 
and some even met their death . They were persecuted by the 
British-controlled Indian government due to their alleged 
involvement in the political movement for Indian independ-
ence .11 This incident is now remembered as a shameful 
moment in Canadian history when the government failed 
to offer protection to those fleeing persecution .12
On May 23, 2008, ninety-four years after the arrival of the 
Komagata Maru, the British Columbia legislature unani-
mously passed a motion apologizing for the deportation of 
the passengers . The spirit of the apology was captured by 
the statements of several members of the legislature . Liberal 
House Leader Mike de Jong stated: “(t)his house deeply 
regrets that the passengers who sought refuge were turned 
away .”13 B .C . Attorney General Wally Oppal said that what 
happened to the passengers is unimaginable today, and 
the government apologizes for the racism and suffering to 
which they were subjected .14
These official statements acknowledge that the deportation 
of the Komagata Maru passengers was unjust and that it is 
important to commemorate this event so that Canadians may 
remember the value of the refugee protection system that is 
now in place . It is worth noting, however, that to describe the 
Komagata Maru passengers as refugees who were wrong-
fully turned away is somewhat anachronistic . Although the 
concept of the refugee has existed for centuries, it was not 
until the signing of the Refugee Convention in 1951 that states 
undertook a legal obligation to offer refuge to those fleeing 
persecution .15 Prior to the Refugee Convention, the right of 
asylum did not exist in law and was not reliably honoured .16 
In the early twentieth century, state governments came to 
view the ancient right of asylum as outdated and in conflict 
with state sovereignty .17 When the Komagata Maru arrived in 
Canada in 1914, there was no legal distinction between immi-
grants and refugees; the immigration laws took no account 
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of an individual’s reasons for leaving their home country, but 
rather focused exclusively on whether they met the criteria to 
enter Canada as immigrants .
Since there was no legal concept of the refugee in 1914, 
the issue of whether or not the passengers were in need of 
protection did not enter the official discourse . The passen-
gers did not raise their fear of persecution in their argu-
ments for why Canada should admit them, and government 
officials did not address the possibility that the passengers 
could be subjected to harm upon their return to India . 
Instead, the debate focused on the legitimacy of the racist 
immigration laws that rendered the passengers inadmissible 
to Canada .18 The passengers, and those advocating on their 
behalf, argued that as British subjects, they should have the 
right to reside in other countries within the British Empire . 
The government’s position was that that under the British 
North America Act (BNA), Canada had the authority to 
regulate immigration, which included the unfettered right 
to exclude undesirable classes of individuals regardless of 
their status as British subjects .19
In the House of Commons, it was uncontroversial that the 
Komagata Maru passengers should be deported and debate 
was limited to the questions of when and how they were 
to be removed .20 Public officials’ statements reflected ani-
mosity toward the passengers, who were popularly viewed 
as part of an invasion of Indian migrants who were taking 
scarce jobs and threatening Canada’s dominant Anglo cul-
ture .21 For example, Frank Oliver, a former Minister of the 
Interior, stated:
(t)o say that we in Canada shall not be able to say who shall join 
us in the work of building up the country, that we must accept the 
dictation of other people as to who shall join in that work, places 
us in the position not of a self-governing state in a free empire, but 
in the position of a subordinate dependency not in control of its 
own affairs .22
This statement exemplifies the government’s strong defence 
of its unfettered right to determine who will be permitted to 
immigrate to Canada, and who will be excluded .
The passengers of the Komagata Maru were inadmissible 
to Canada as a result of three immigration laws designed 
to exclude migrants from the “Asiatic races”: (1) P .C . 24, an 
order-in-council that required Asian immigrants to pay a 
$200 fee upon entry;23 (2) P .C . 23, the “continuous journey 
regulation,” which stated that all immigrants to Canada must 
come directly from their country of origin by an uninter-
rupted journey24 (this regulation prevented immigration 
from India because there was no direct steamship service 
from South Asia to Canada at the time);25 and (3) P .C . 897, 
which prohibited migrant labourers from entering Canada 
through British Columbia (since the majority of migrant 
labourers seeking to enter British Columbia were Asian, this 
regulation also limited immigration from India) .26
Ironically, it was because of these exclusionary provisions 
that the passengers of the Komagata Maru came to arrive 
in Canada . The voyage was organized by Gurdit Singh, a 
wealthy Indian migrant living in Hong Kong who wanted 
to challenge the three orders-in-council that prevented 
Indians from immigrating to Canada .27 He was encouraged 
by a party of Indian migrants who had successfully chal-
lenged the validity of early versions of the orders-in-council 
the previous year . The court overturned the regulations on 
a technicality and the Cabinet immediately amended and 
reissued the orders .28
G . Singh chartered the Komagata Maru to transport a 
group of Indian migrants from Hong Kong to Canada .29 On 
May 23, when the Komagata Maru arrived near Vancouver, 
immigration authorities prevented it from docking . An 
immigration launch with armed guards perpetually circled 
the ship to ensure that the passengers remained on board .30 
Some local politicians and immigration officials were in 
favour of deporting the passengers without giving them 
the opportunity to challenge their removal in the courts . 
Prime Minister Borden, however, did not approve of cir-
cumventing the legal process . Instead, he instructed the 
immigration board to complete its inquiry as soon as pos-
sible and issue a decision . On June 25, Borden sent a wire to 
Reid which stated:
(y)ou should take no step which in any way admits the jurisdiction 
of the Court to interfere, but if the immigrants initiate proceed-
ings, it is important to secure a hearing before the Court which 
will give a reasonable construction to the Act and regulations .31
Borden’s statement indicates that he hoped the passen-
gers would not discover that they had a right to challenge 
the exclusion order in court . If they did apply for judicial 
review, however, he instructed Reid to ensure that the mat-
ter be decided by a court that would interpret the applic-
able laws in a “reasonable” manner . This implies that he 
wanted to avoid a repeat of the scenario in 1913 when a 
judge determined that the anti-Indian regulations were 
inoperative .
This interpretation is supported by Hugh J .M . Johnston’s 
account of negotiations between government officials and 
G . Singh that resulted in the matter going straight to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, as opposed to being 
heard first at the lower court level . According to Johnston, 
the government was worried that in the lower court, there 
was a risk that the exclusion order would be reviewed by a 
rogue judge who might find a flaw in the orders-in-council . 
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With a three-judge panel at the Court of Appeal, the risk 
was significantly lessened .32
A Vancouver-based organization called the United 
India League hired lawyers to challenge the exclusion 
order against one of the passengers, Munshi Singh, as a test 
case .33 The applicant’s main argument was that Canada did 
not have authority under the BNA to exclude a British sub-
ject . However, the Court accepted the government’s argu-
ment that s . 95 of the BNA granted Canada jurisdiction over 
immigration, which includes the right to define prohibited 
classes . Under this authority, the government had the power 
to exclude undesirable persons even if they were British 
subjects .34
After the Court issued its decision, Reid informed G . 
Singh that the Komagata Maru had to depart .35 The passen-
gers refused, so immigration authorities limited deliveries 
of food and water to the ship in an effort to coerce them to 
leave .36 They were told that they would be given provisions 
at a point outside of Canadian waters .37 A skirmish broke 
out between the passengers and the police in which several 
people were injured but no one was killed .38
Official statements regarding the incident indicated a 
desire to quell public anxiety about the chaos surround-
ing the incident . According to Eric W . Morse, the public 
opinion in Vancouver was charged “to a fever-point” with 
anti-Indian sentiment . Residents sent wires to the govern-
ment urging them to get rid of the Komagata Maru pas-
sengers, who were perceived as “invaders .”39 On July 20, 
the Assistant Superintendent of Immigration, E . Blake 
Robertson, issued a press notice saying that the navy vessel 
the HMCS Rainbow had been deployed “to effect a landing, 
when, if necessary, in order to secure and maintain control, 
the full number of Hindus will be handcuffed, a proceed-
ing which in view of their violent actions last night, is fully 
justifiable .”40 In this statement, Robertson communicated 
to the public that the Komagata Maru passengers were vio-
lent criminals who needed to be controlled .
The characterization of the passengers as criminals was 
also apparent in intragovernmental communications . For 
example, MP H .H . Stevens sent a wire to the Prime Minister 
in which he referred to the passengers as “desperately revo-
lutionary and determined to defy law” and recommended 
that the navy take control of the situation .41 On July 21, Reid 
wired the Immigration Department in Ottawa:
(w)e urge immediate action owing to danger of anti-Oriental 
outbreaks in Vancouver when facts are made public . The men 
aboard are undoubtedly in a desperate and fanatical condition . It 
is utterly impossible to reason with them or to handle them in 
the ordinary manner . The peculiar situation of this riot occurring 
on board a ship anchored in the stream makes ordinary police 
methods utterly useless, as police and guards do not wish to use 
firearms to retaliate, and can do no effective service without .42
These official statements indicate that the focus was on 
how to get the ship to leave in the most peaceful fashion pos-
sible . The officials not only were concerned about violence 
among the passengers, but also were fearful of a violent 
“anti-Oriental” response from the public . On July 23, the 
navy deployed the HMCS Rainbow to escort the Komagata 
Maru out to sea while onlookers cheered .43
When the ship returned to Calcutta, India, it was greeted 
by the police . Some of the passengers were arrested, some 
were shot as they tried to escape, and the others became fugi-
tives .44 By October 13, 1914, a total of 19 of the passengers 
were reported to have been killed .45 Subsequently, between 
April 1915 and May 1917, a series of trials targeting polit-
ical agitators took place in India: 175 people were charged 
with political crimes, 20 were hanged, 76 were banished for 
life to India’s convict colony, and 58 were imprisoned for 
shorter terms .46 At least two of the Komagata Maru passen-
gers were among those convicted and sentenced, and others 
were subjected to suspicions which restricted their ability to 
work and move freely in the country .47
My review of the official discourse surrounding the 
Komagata Maru incident identifies three main themes: (1) 
defence of racist immigration policies; (2) lack of respect for 
procedural protections; and (3) fear of violence and crimin-
ality . The officials’ statements clearly indicate that in 1914, 
Canada was not concerned with the plight of those fleeing 
from oppressive regimes such as British-controlled India . 
Although the modern concept of the “refugee” did not exist 
at the time, it is worthwhile to consider how Canadian offi-
cials reacted to the arrival of the Komagata Maru, as it pro-
vides a picture of how Canada reacted to people who were 
likely in need of asylum prior to the coming into force of the 
1951 Refugee Convention . In the following section, which 
draws on secondary sources and my own review of news-
paper articles, I will demonstrate how Canadian officials 
responded to the arrival of refugees by boat in 1986 .
Part II. The 1986 Incident
On August 11, 1986, 15548 Sri Lankan Tamils, including 
men, women, and children, were rescued by fishermen off 
the coast of Newfoundland after spending five days adrift in 
two lifeboats .49 The passengers told their rescuers through 
a translator that they came to Canada in the hope of escap-
ing the violence of the civil war in their home country .50 
The day after the Tamils were rescued, they were brought 
to St . John’s where they were met by an emergency team of 
immigration officials who had been sent to conduct inter-
views .51 One hundred and forty-four were taken to the 
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RCMP headquarters for questioning, after which they were 
taken to the residences at Memorial University for tempor-
ary accommodation .52 Once the interviews were complete, 
the refugees were taken to Toronto and Montreal to be con-
nected with Tamil groups that had offered to find homes 
where they could stay .53
At the time, the Canadian government had a policy of not 
deporting individuals to certain refugee-producing coun-
tries .54 The list of designated countries, called the “B1 list,” 
included Sri Lanka . 55 Ottawa frequently issued one-year 
minister’s permits to asylum seekers from the designated 
countries, which entitled them to live and work in Canada . 
The individual had the right to apply for refugee protection, 
or could simply apply to renew the permit at the end of the 
one-year period . Following this practice, the government 
issued minister’s permits to the 155 Tamils almost immedi-
ately after they arrived .56 The Tamils’ refugee applications 
were put on hold because the refugee determination system 
was undergoing a major overhaul .57
The decision to grant the minister’s permits proved to be 
controversial and elicited criticism from Members of the 
Opposition and members of the public who felt that the 
government had acted too hastily in granting the Tamils 
legal status in Canada .58 Some Conservative MPs reported 
a flood of complaints from constituents complaining that 
the Tamils were being given preferential treatment over pro-
spective immigrants seeking to enter Canada legally .59
In contrast to the Komagata Maru, my review of the 
official discourse surrounding the 1986 incident identifies 
humanitarianism as the dominant theme . Public officials 
also referred to the need for immigration reform and con-
cerns about security and criminality, but these concerns 
were characterized as secondary to Canada’s obligation to 
protect individuals fleeing from persecution .
Initially, the refugees indicated that they had come dir-
ectly from Madras, India, despite evidence that their voyage 
originated in West Germany . For example, many of them 
had West German currency and their possessions were 
wrapped in West German newspapers .60 This contradic-
tion led some to argue that the refugees should have been 
returned to West Germany . Progressive Conservative MP 
Jim Hawkes took this view when he stated: “(w)e can’t have 
people, once they have escaped from persecution, simply 
shopping around for the country that’s the most comfort-
able .”61 This line of argument is premised on the idea that 
refugees are expected to claim asylum at the first opportun-
ity . In other words, if a refugee claimant passes through one 
potential country of asylum to get to another, it is suspected 
that they are not fleeing persecution but are rather searching 
for economic opportunities . Following this reasoning, one 
could also argue that the Sri Lankans ought to have sought 
protection in India, but this argument did not appear in my 
research .
Bouchard announced that due to the government’s policy 
of not deporting people to Sri Lanka, the refugees would 
have been given minister’s permits even if it was confirmed 
that they came via West Germany .62 Gerry Weiner, Canada’s 
Minister of State for Immigration, further explained the 
government’s stance on this issue: “I have no difficulty right 
now in saying that they will be allowed to stay (whether 
their story is correct or not) . There’s no reason why these 
people should not be allowed to stay in our country .”63 This 
statement indicates that the government was willing to offer 
protection to the Tamils, even if they had lied about how 
they came to Canada .
It was eventually confirmed that at least some of the 
refugees had been living in West Germany and had sub-
mitted applications for refugee protection before they 
came to Canada . On August 16, Bouchard admitted that 
West Germany had alerted Canada to the smuggling 
operation long before the ship left for Canada . The West 
German authorities had learned of the operation from an 
anonymous caller, presumed to be a Sri Lankan refugee 
who had paid to be transported to Canada but had been 
left behind .64
In response to criticisms that the government should 
have acted on West Germany’s warning, Bouchard stated 
that Ottawa was merely carrying out its policies with respect 
to Sri Lankan refugees . Referring to Canada’s policy of not 
deporting individuals from the B1 list countries, Bouchard 
stated:
(i)f you have, for example, one boat a week in Newfoundland, what 
will you do? Until the change of the law, I cannot do anything else 
than what I did this week [ … ] Personally, as a minister, I would 
not have accepted that human beings be left on boats for days on 
the pretext that we had not finished the inquiry into whether they 
were telling the truth or not (about whether their voyage began in 
India or West Germany .65
With this statement, Bouchard indicates that he decided to 
issue the minister’s permits because he was required to do 
so by law . At the same time, he implies that if it had not 
been for the B1 list, he would have issued the permits due to 
the humanitarian nature of the situation . The result of these 
statements is a mixed message: on the one hand he defends 
the decision as morally correct, but on the other hand he 
blames the decision on the policy .  
On August 17, a spokesperson for the 155 Tamils admit-
ted that their voyage began in West Germany and not in 
India as they had originally claimed . He explained that 
the Tamils decided to come to Canada because as asylum 
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seekers in West Germany they were subjected to oppres-
sive conditions such as police harassment and policies that 
restricted their freedom of movement . They indicated that 
they decided to tell the truth after they had been granted 
minister permits and no longer feared being sent back to 
West Germany .66
On the same day, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney made 
his first public statement regarding the arrival of the 155 
Tamils . In the face of public uproar over the Tamils’ admis-
sion that they had lied to Canadian authorities, Mulroney 
strenuously defended the government’s decision to grant 
them protection:
(m)y government will do anything but allow refugees in lifeboats 
to be turned aimlessly around in the ocean and turned away from 
our shores . [ … ] We don’t want people jumping to the head of the 
line . We don’t want injustice introduced into the system . We don’t 
want excessive delays . But there will always be human suffering 
and human misery and there will be people who come (to Canada) 
for freedom [ … ] . And if we err … we will always err on the side 
of justice and on the side of compassion .67
In response to calls for immigration reform, Mulroney 
stated that the government would examine current laws 
and policies and “tighten up procedures if required,” but he 
emphasized that the need for reform was separate from the 
question of whether or not Canada would offer protection to 
refugees who arrive on its shores:
Canada was built by immigrants and refugees, and those who 
arrive in lifeboats off our shores are not going to be turned away . 
[ … ] And it’s not the presence of (155) frightened human beings 
searching for freedom and opportunity that’s going to undermine 
Canada of our immigration policies .68
With these statements, Mulroney sends a clear message 
that Canada is committed to assisting refugees and that 
granting protection to individuals who travel to Canada 
illegally does not jeopardize the integrity of the immigra-
tion system . Mulroney also indicates that, given the high 
stakes involved for the individual, the government will pre-
sume that a refugee claimant’s fears are well-founded until 
proven otherwise .
Mulroney’s statement that Canada does not want people 
“jumping to the head of the line” appears to be an acknow-
ledgement of the Opposition’s criticism that Canada’s 
generous refugee policies are unfair to people who wait 
patiently to immigrate to the country . Mulroney downplays 
these concerns by stressing Canada’s obligation to protect 
refugees . Weiner, the Minister of State for Immigration, 
also addressed this critique by pointing out that “(t)here’s 
a difference between an immigrant and a refugee and a 
refugee cannot wait for a number .”69 With this statement, 
Weiner supports Mulroney’s position that refugee claim-
ants do not undermine Canada’s immigration system, and 
explains that refugees are not the same as immigrants . He 
recognizes that refugees by definition are fleeing persecu-
tion and sometimes have to leave their home country in 
urgent circumstances . Therefore, it is inappropriate to sug-
gest that refugees are jumping the line .
The day after the 155 Tamils admitted that their trip began 
in West Germany, a West German radio station reported 
suspicions that they belonged to the Tamil Tigers, a Sri 
Lankan political organization that a number of countries 
have designated a terrorist group .70 Weiner rejected these 
suspicions as ill-founded: “We now have really a preliminary 
confirmation that none of these 155 fall into that category (of 
terrorists), that they are all refugees, that they are all ordin-
ary citizens .”71 At the same time, however, Weiner indicated 
that authorities were continuing security investigations to 
determine whether or not the Tamils were involved in any 
criminal activity: “(w)e began fingerprinting them all, and 
if there’s any information that becomes available right now, 
then that will be acted on at once .”72 Weiner also stated that 
the policy of not deporting individuals to Sri Lanka can be 
disregarded in the case of criminals .73 Weiner’s statements 
send the message that although the refugees are presumed 
to be innocent, Canadian law enforcement authorities are 
taking the appropriate steps to investigate whether any have 
criminal backgrounds .
Bouchard made similar comments in which he indicated 
that although Canada places a high value on humanitarian-
ism, this value must be balanced against security concerns: 
“Canadians are as much concerned by security as they are by 
hospitality . We’ve had a tradition (of hospitality) in Canada 
but at the same time Canadians are getting to be perhaps 
a little bit more prudent and they want politicians to see 
exactly what’s the involvement of such an adventure .”74 
However, like Weiner, Bouchard stressed that there will be 
no “pre-judgment” of the asylum seekers and that questions 
about terrorism and other forms of criminality would be left 
to the RCMP .75
Although officials acknowledged concerns about the 
integrity of the immigration system and security threats, 
humanitarianism stood out as the overriding priority . On 
September 5, in response to continuing criticisms from the 
Opposition, Mulroney once again defended the decision to 
grant the minister’s permits:
I won’t quarrel with you in terms of some of the technical bureau-
cratic matters [ … ] in the Tamil case . [ … ] But the fundamental 
issue is, are refugees welcome in Canada and will we open our 
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doors? The answer is yes . [ … ] One of the saddest things that has 
happened to this country was during the ’40s . Families and fam-
ilies and families of Jewish refugees seeking entry into Canada 
and they were turned away by red tape . That will never happen 
while Brian Mulroney is prime minister .76
With this statement, Mulroney emphasized Canada’s com-
mitment to humanitarianism and indicated that when in 
doubt, Canada will offer protection to those who seek it .
By August of 1991, five years after they arrived, the major-
ity of the 155 Tamil refugees were still without permanent 
resident status in Canada . An estimated 90 per cent of them 
were still on minister’s permits and were waiting for their 
refugee claims to be heard . Since they did not have perma-
nent resident status, their situation remained precarious 
and they could not sponsor their family members to join 
them in Canada .77
As I have demonstrated in this section, the official dis-
course surrounding the arrival of the 155 Tamils in 1986 
contrasts sharply with the Komagata Maru discourse . In 
1914, official statements conveyed defence of Canada’s 
exclusionary immigration laws and a desire to prevent the 
Komagata Maru passengers from gaining access to the 
courts . The officials characterized the passengers as crimin-
als who posed a threat to public order, apparently because 
their presence was considered likely to ignite anti-Oriental 
riots . By contrast, the 1986 discourse focused on Canada’s 
legal and moral commitment to protect refugees . Public 
officials suggested that when people come to Canada seek-
ing asylum, they will be presumed to be refugees in the 
absence of evidence that they are not in need of protection 
or are engaged in criminal or terrorist activities . In the fol-
lowing section, which draws on my review of news articles, 
Hansard, and the cited Federal Court case, I will show how 
the discourse has shifted again . In 2009, official statements 
regarding the arrival of the Ocean Lady did not convey the 
pro-refugee attitudes that prevailed in 1986 . Rather, the 
discourse focused on the threat of terrorism and crimin-
ality and the need to make Canada’s refugee policies more 
restrictive .
Part III. The Ocean Lady Incident
On October 16, 2009, Canadian authorities intercepted the 
Ocean Lady, a cargo ship carrying 76 Sri Lankan Tamil 
men, off the coast of British Columbia . The RCMP had been 
alerted to the ship by international “security partners .”78 
After following the ship for approximately twenty hours, 
an RCMP emergency response team seized the vessel and 
guided it to Victoria with the assistance of the Canadian 
Navy .79 Once the ship was docked, the Canadian Border 
Services Agency CBSA took the ship’s 76 passengers into 
custody80 and conducted initial admissibility interviews 
and medical examinations at the cruise ship terminal .81 
The following day, the men were transported to a Vancouver 
detention facility .82 It is not publicly known whether the 
men have formally applied for refugee protection . However, 
two of the Ocean Lady passengers communicated through 
their lawyer that they indended to pursue refugee claims .83 
Also, considering the widespread persecution of Tamils in 
Sri Lanka, it is reasonable to assume that the men would 
have exercised their right to make a claim for protection .
All of the 76 men were initially kept in custody because 
they lacked documentation and were deemed flight risks .84 
Pursuant to s . 57(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Act (IRPA), when a foreign national is taken into detention, 
the IRB must hold a detention review within forty-eight 
hours “or without delay afterward” and determine whether 
continued detention is warranted .85 In the case of the Ocean 
Lady passengers, although they were placed in detention on 
October 17, it was not until October 23 that all of the 76 men 
had appeared before the IRB for a detention review .86
During question period in the House of Commons 
on October 20, MP Don Davies (Vancouver Kingsway, 
NDP) highlighted the plight of Tamils in Sri Lanka and 
accused Ottawa of obstructing the migrant’s access to 
legal counsel:
Mr . Speaker, the Sri Lankan government is making life unbear-
able for the Tamil population [ … ] Now there are 76 Tamil refu-
gees on the coast of British Columbia and we are hearing that the 
right to counsel within 48 hours is being violated . Will (Minister 
Kenney) ensure that this is corrected and that there is fast, fair and 
legal adjudication of these men’s claims?87
Kenney rejected this allegation, and stated that the refugees 
were being processed in full accordance with the IRPA .88
On October 23, 2009, the media reported that one of the 
Tamil refugees, named Kartheepan Manickavasagar, was 
the subject of an Interpol notice issued by the Sri Lankan 
government . He was reportedly wanted for an “unspeci-
fied terrorism offence” and was suspected of being involved 
with the Tamil Tigers . Manickavasagar was also alleged to 
have been a member of an elite suicide squad of the Tamil 
Tigers called the Black Tigers . According to the Sri Lankan 
Criminal Investigation Department, it had been looking for 
him since September of 2008 .89 In response to these reports, 
Canadian Tamil Congress spokesman David Poopalapillai 
said that the charges against Manickavasagar should be 
treated with caution since the Sri Lankan government often 
wrongly accuses ethnic Tamils of terrorism .90
In early November, the IRB adjourned the detention 
review of a dozen of the 76 Tamils because CBSA indicated 
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that it would be seeking their continued detention on secur-
ity grounds .91 According to Lee Rankin, a lawyer repre-
senting some of the refugees, the alleged security threat was 
based on trace amounts of plastic explosives that had been 
found on the Ocean Lady, news clippings linking the vessel 
to the Tamil Tigers, and a terrorism expert’s theory that the 
ship had been part of the Tamil Tigers’ weapons-smuggling 
fleet .92
On December 16, 2009, the IRB ordered approximately 
50 of the men to be released with conditions . The Minister 
of Citizenship and Immigration (the Minister) challenged 
the release of one of the men in order to keep him in deten-
tion while officials continued to investigate his suspected 
association with the Tamil Tigers . On February 2, 2010, the 
Federal Court in Vancouver granted the Minister’s appli-
cation for judicial review, which meant that the subject of 
the release order, referred to as XXXX in the judgment, 
remained in custody .93
Writing on behalf of the Federal Court in M .C .I . v . 
XXXX, Barnes J . stated that the IRB misinterpreted the 
scope of its authority under s . 58(1)(c) of the IRPA . Pursuant 
to s . 58(1)(c), the IRB must order the release of a foreign 
national unless it is satisfied that the Minister is taking 
necessary steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that 
they are inadmissible on security grounds . The presiding 
IRB member reviewed the government’s allegations, and 
determined that that there was insufficient evidence linking 
XXXX to the Tamil Tigers . While the member accepted 
that it was possible that the Ocean Lady belonged to the 
Tamil Tigers and that several of the passengers were likely 
Tamil Tigers members, he found that there was no evidence 
that connected XXXX personally to the terrorist group .94 
Further, the member found that the Minister’s proposed 
steps were unlikely to give rise to new information that 
would substantiate the suspicion . For example, the member 
questioned the likelihood that additional swabbing for 
traces of explosives on the ship would implicate XXXX, 
especially since he was not one of the two passengers found 
with traces on his clothing .95
According to Barnes J ., the IRB member did not have 
authority to determine that the Minister’s suspicion 
regarding XXXX was unreasonable . Based on a plain read-
ing of s . 58(1)(c), wrote Barnes J ., the IRB must defer to the 
Minister on this issue . The provision does not grant the IRB 
authority to conduct a de novo assessment of the evidence 
and decide for itself whether a reasonable suspicion exists .96 
As such, the IRB member could only have determined that 
the Minister’s suspicion was unreasonable if it was based on 
nothing more than “bare intuition or pure speculation .”97 
In this case, said Barnes J ., the government’s suspicion was 
based on objectively ascertainable facts, and so it could not 
be said that it was unreasonable . Barnes J . held that the 
IRB’s inquiry should have focused on whether the Minister 
was taking necessary steps to verify the suspicion .98 In clos-
ing, Barnes J . wrote:
(w)hile the importance of not unduly detaining such persons can-
not be forgotten, the protection of Canadians and Canada’s press-
ing interest in securing its borders are also worthy considerations . 
The government cannot use s . 58(1)(c) as the basis for indefinitely 
detaining foreign nationals, but it is entitled to a reasonable time 
to complete its admissibility investigation .99
Since this decision was released, all of the 76 Ocean Lady 
passengers have been released from custody, some with 
strict conditions .100
Based on my review of the newspaper articles and par-
liamentary debates surrounding the Ocean Lady incident, 
I identify three main themes: (1) concerns about human 
smuggling; (2) protectiveness of the integrity of the immi-
gration system; and (3) concerns about security and crimin-
ality . Humanitarianism, which stood out as the dominant 
concern in 1986, was notably absent from the official dis-
course surrounding the arrival of the Ocean Lady . In some 
respects, the 2009 discourse appears to have more in com-
mon with the discourse in 1914 . For example, just as in 1914, 
public officials characterized the Ocean Lady passengers as 
criminals who posed a threat to both the integrity of the 
immigration system and public safety .
Given the distinct historical and legal contexts in 1914 
and 2009, concerns about the integrity of the immigration 
system and public safety were presented somewhat differ-
ently . In 1914, the integrity of the immigration system was 
an overtly racial issue as public officials defended laws that 
excluded the Komagata Maru passengers on the basis of 
their race . The characterization of the passengers as crim-
inals was also clearly rooted in racist views about Asian 
migrants . In 2009, although racism was arguably still a fac-
tor, it was no longer explicit . In defence of the integrity of the 
immigration system, officials focused on the need to curb 
“abuse” of the refugee system by economic migrants posing 
as asylum seekers . On its face, this argument is racially neu-
tral, although the alleged “abusers” are invariably people of 
colour . Public officials’ concerns about criminality in 2009 
were also less overtly racist than they were in 1914, although 
it is undeniable that the Ocean Lady passengers were sus-
pected of being security threats because of their ethnicity 
and country of origin .
Early reports of the Ocean Lady highlighted concerns 
about human smuggling . The day after the Ocean Lady was 
seized, Peter Van Loan, the Minister of Public Safety, stated: 
“(o)bviously, they are arriving in a non-conventional fashion 
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so that raises concerns … of human smuggling .”101 He con-
tinued: “(t)he CBSA is working with domestic and inter-
national partners to combat irregular migration to Canada, 
including smuggling and trafficking in persons .”102 With 
these statements, Van Loan characterizes the Ocean Lady 
passengers as victims of human smuggling, and conveys 
that human smuggling is a crime that Canada takes ser-
iously and is working to combat . He also indicates that one 
of the reasons for combating human smuggling is to prevent 
unauthorized migrants from entering Canada .
On October 19, Immigration Minister Kenney told the 
Globe and Mail that human smuggling is a growing prob-
lem and that the illegal arrival of the Ocean Lady highlights 
the need for stricter enforcement .103 In another statement to 
the press, Kenney said:
(w)e obviously don’t want to encourage people to get into rick-
ety boats, pay thousands of dollars, cross the oceans and come to 
Canada illegally . [ … ] Without prejudice to this particular group 
of people, all I can say is that as a country we need to make sure 
we are not creating a kind of perverse incentive for people to try 
to come to the country through these kind of really dangerous 
circumstances .104
In this statement, Kenney appears to want to convey concern 
for the safety and well-being of the Ocean Lady passengers . 
At the same time, Kenney implies that Canada should not 
offer protection to these individuals so as not to encourage 
others to follow in their footsteps . Therefore, like the state-
ments regarding human smuggling, this statement appears 
to be focused on securing Canada’s borders and protecting 
the integrity of the immigration system .
These statements regarding the government’s commit-
ment to curb human smuggling and illegal migration to 
Canada point to an interesting question: did Canadian 
authorities know that the Ocean Lady was carrying 
unauthorized migrants bound for British Columbia before 
it entered Canadian waters? And if so, why did they choose 
not to intercept the vessel earlier? From the media reports, 
it is unclear at what point Canadian officials detected the 
Ocean Lady . On October 18, the Toronto Star reported that 
the Ocean Lady was already in Canadian waters on the 
October 15, which means that the ship may have already 
been in Canadian waters when the RCMP began to fol-
low it .105 On November 24, however, the Toronto Globe 
and Mail reported that a CBSA officer said he learned the 
migrant ship was on its way to Canadian waters two days 
before it arrived . According to the officer, ships as large as 
the Ocean Lady are required to notify a coast guard ninety-
six hours before arriving . When the ship failed to do so, a 
federal fisheries airplane was sent to observe it .106 Based on 
this report, it seems possible that Canadian authorities were 
aware of the ship before it entered Canadian waters .
If the Ocean Lady had in fact been detected in inter-
national waters, authorities could have intercepted it before 
the migrants had entered Canadian territory and thereby 
prevented them from gaining access to the refugee deter-
mination system . Like most developed countries, Canada 
implements interdiction measures to prevent unauthor-
ized migrants from entering Canadian territory and 
thereby gaining access to the inland refugee determina-
tion process .107 These measures include screening passen-
gers in airports overseas before permitting them to board 
planes bound for Canada . Some states, such as Australia 
and the United states, also track down and intercept ves-
sels suspected of carrying unauthorized migrants at sea .108 
Although Canada is not known to engage in maritime inter-
ception independently, it has been involved in interception 
missions in partnership with other states .109
Interception is controversial because the Refugee 
Convention obliges signatory states to refrain from returning 
refugees to countries where they could face persecution .110 
Some state parties have taken the view that this obligation is 
only triggered at the moment when an individual sets foot 
on the state’s territory . Some scholars, however, advance the 
view that the obligation not to return a refugee to a coun-
try where s/he may face persecution includes the obligation 
not to intercept and deflect refugees before they arrive in 
the state’s territory .111 It is possible that the Canadian gov-
ernment chose not to intercept the Ocean Lady because it 
wanted to avoid opening up the question of whether or not 
such an action would contravene the Refugee Convention . 
This of course, is merely speculation, as it is not possible 
to know for certain why Canadian authorities may have 
decided to allow the Ocean Lady enter Canadian waters . It 
is interesting to note that a conscious decision to permit the 
refugees to enter Canada illegally stands in contrast to the 
official rhetoric surrounding the incident, which implies 
that Canada takes border control seriously and is taking 
action to prevent and discourage illegal migration .
The themes of border control and the integrity of 
Canada’s immigration system are also apparent in a set of 
public statements in which Kenney called for policy reforms 
to prevent abuse of the refugee system . Kenney stated that 
Canada does not want to develop a “two-tier immigration 
system” where some people wait patiently to immigrate to 
Canada, while others come to Canada illegally through the 
“back door .” Many of those who enter Canada through the 
“back door,” says Kenney, often do so by making a refugee 
claim, which is an abuse of the refugee system and unfair 
to those who come to Canada by legal channels .112 In mak-
ing these arguments in relation to the Ocean Lady incident, 
Volume 26 Refuge Number 2
200
Kenney implies that the passengers are among those try-
ing to immigrate to Canada through the “back door .” No 
account is made for the possibility that they may have well-
founded fear of persecution .
In addition to these arguments about the “two-tier 
immigration system,” Kenney also took the opportunity to 
criticize Canada’s refugee determination process as overly 
generous: “(w)hen a large number of people arrive off the 
coast in one boat, it attracts people’s attention . But I can tell 
you there were airplanes arriving from Prague this sum-
mer where over half the passengers were going on to make 
asylum claims .”113 With this statement, Kenney appears to 
want to raise public alarm over the number of people mak-
ing refugee claims in Canada . He characterizes the arrival 
of the Ocean Lady as a part of a larger problem of masses of 
foreigners seeking to make refugee claims in Canada .
Another theme in Kenney’s statements regarding the 
Ocean Lady is security and the fear of terrorism . On October 
21, Kenney announced that security authorities were inves-
tigating the Ocean Lady’s passengers to determine whether 
they have connections to any terrorist organizations, in 
which case they would be inadmissible to Canada .114 
Kenney’s spokesperson, Alykhan Velshi, emphasized the 
government’s commitment to deport any of the Ocean Lady 
passengers found to have terrorist connections or other 
criminal involvement:
(t)he government will strenuously argue that every single one of 
these individuals with terrorist or criminal backgrounds—and 
that includes membership in the murderous Tamil Tigers—is 
ineligible to make a refugee claim in Canada . [ … ] We won’t allow 
Canada to become a place of refuge for terrorist, thugs, snake-
heads and other violent foreign criminals . Nor will we support 
those who want to create a two-tier immigration system: one tier 
for law-abiding immigrants who wait patiently in the queue, and a 
second, for-profit tier for criminals and terrorists who pay human 
smugglers to help them jump the queue .115
Although Velshi did not say that any of the Ocean Lady pas-
sengers have been confirmed to be associated with the Tamil 
Tigers, this statement carries a strong implication that such 
terrorist connections are possible if not likely . Velshi also 
links the issue of terrorism with the other concerns about 
human smuggling and violation of Canada’s immigration 
laws . He suggests that those who pay human smugglers to 
help them enter Canada are “criminal and terrorists,” and 
does not acknowledge that individuals fleeing persecution 
may also have to resort to such means of transportation .
Part IV. Comparative Analysis
The official statements examined in this paper do not 
offer a comprehensive picture of changes in refugee policy 
throughout Canadian history, and I do not mean to suggest 
that my research offers any definitive conclusions . Rather, I 
propose that this sample of official discourse provides snap-
shots of Canada’s changing stance toward asylum seekers 
at three distinct points in history . In each section of the 
paper, I identified the main themes in the official discourse 
surrounding the three incidents . In this final section of the 
paper, I analyze the official discourse surrounding the three 
selected incidents, and consider the differences and similar-
ities in the treatment of the following key issues: (1) security 
and criminality, (2) the integrity of the immigration system, 
and (3) humanitarianism .
Security and Criminality
Concerns about security and criminality played out in all 
three discourses, although in different ways . This theme 
appeared to be strongest in the official statements regarding 
the Komagata Maru incident . In this case, politicians charac-
terized the Indian migrants as violent criminals who needed 
to be controlled with strong coercive measures . This situation 
is somewhat unique, however, because the Komagata Maru 
passengers did in fact resort to violent measures to resist their 
removal . However, the language of some of the statements, 
which depicted the migrants as “fanatical” and “desperately 
revolutionary and determined to defy the law,” intimate the 
anti-Asian sentiments among Canadian officials at the time 
and therefore appear to be more than an objective observa-
tion of the passengers’ violent actions . The depiction of the 
passengers as criminals was justified by the legal regime 
because as Indian migrants they were breaking the law simply 
by virtue of their presence in Canadian territory . In this sense, 
the 1914 discourse linked concerns about criminality to fears 
about racial threats to Canadian society . In short, Canadian 
officials were of the view that members of the “Asiatic races” 
had no place in Canadian society, and any Asian attempting 
to enter Canada would be treated as a criminal .
In contrast to 1914, when the migrants were criminalized 
due to their race, in 1986 and 2009 the discussions about 
security and criminality focused on fears about terrorism . 
Specifically, the refugees were feared to be members of the 
Tamil Tigers . In 1986, officials communicated to the pub-
lic that the proper authorities were conducting background 
checks on the 155 Tamil refugees but that there was no evi-
dence linking the individuals to terrorism or other crim-
inal activities . Security concerns were considered to be less 
important than Canada’s commitment to protecting refu-
gees, and the refugees were presumed to be innocent until 
proven otherwise .
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In 2009, however, the official discourse evidences a rever-
sal in the presumption; the refugees were presumed to be a 
threat until it could be established that they were not . The 
official discourse characterized the refugees as suspected 
terrorists . This was clear in the government spokesperson’s 
comment that placed the Ocean Lady passengers in the same 
category as “terrorists, thugs, snakeheads and other violent 
foreign criminals .” This shift in the rhetoric was mirrored 
by changes in the government’s procedures for dealing with 
asylum seekers arriving by boat . In contrast to 1986, when 
the refugees were put up in a university dorm and then sent 
to stay with members of the Sri Lankan community, the 
Ocean Lady passengers were detained upon arrival and held 
in detention for several months as the government inves-
tigated their suspected terrorist links . In this sense, the 
emphasis on criminality that was apparent in 1914 incident 
seems to have been revived in the current context .
Integrity of the Immigration System
The issue of the integrity of the immigration system also 
featured in each of the three discourses . Before I discuss 
how this issue played out in each of the three incidents, it 
is worth exploring why refugee claimants are sometimes 
feared to pose a threat to the integrity of the immigration 
system . I contend that this fear flows from a desire to main-
tain control over national borders . Like most countries, 
Canada implements immigration laws that determine who 
will be selected to immigrate to the country and who will 
be denied . Unlike immigration applicants, however, asylum 
seekers are self-selected . When Canada signed the Refugee 
Convention, it committed itself to accept individuals with a 
well-founded fear of persecution, regardless of whether or 
not they meet the criteria to immigrate to Canada . In this 
sense, immigration law and refugee law are two separate 
systems that can both result in the admission of a foreign 
national . In the case of the immigration system, the gov-
ernment retains control over admissions, whereas with the 
refugee system, the government is obliged to accept any 
foreign national who arrives in Canadian territory and is 
found to meet the definition of Convention refugee . This 
difference appears to foster a sense of loss of control among 
public officials, which can result in calls for restrictions on 
the refugee system in order to strengthen the government’s 
control over who will be admitted to the country .
In 1914, the integrity of the immigration system was 
understood in racial terms . The legal regime in place at the 
time was designed to exclude Asians generally, and Indian 
migrants specifically . Officials defended these restrictions 
as Canada’s right to determine what type of people will 
be permitted to join Canadian society . This sentiment was 
particularly evident in the former Minister of the Interior’s 
statement that Canada will not accept the dictation of other 
people as to who will join Canadian society . With this state-
ment, the official made it clear that Canada would not wel-
come the Komagata Maru passengers who sought to enter 
Canada contrary to the immigration laws that explicitly 
excluded them . Maintaining the integrity of the immigra-
tion system meant ensuring that people like the passengers 
were kept out .
In 1986 and 2009, the issue of the integrity of the immi-
gration system was no longer an explicitly racial issue . 
Instead, the issue took the form of discussions about the 
need for policy reform to limit the number of people who 
enter Canada through the refugee system . In 1986, officials 
addressed concerns among members of the Opposition 
that the refugee policies were too generous . While they 
acknowledged the need for policy reform, they emphasized 
that Canada must adhere to its humanitarian commitment 
to protect refugees . Like the security concerns, although 
fears about threats to the immigration system were 
acknowledged, they were minimized by the more pressing 
concern of the refugee claimants’ need for protection from 
persecution .
In the 2009 discourse, however, officials placed a much 
stronger emphasis on the need to restrict the flow of refu-
gees to Canada . This is apparent in Minister Kenney’s com-
ments in which he suggests that the Ocean Lady passengers 
sought to use the refugee system as a “back door” to immi-
grate to Canada . With these comments, Kenney rechar-
acterizes refugee claimants as immigrants looking for an 
easy way to enter Canada . Viewed through this lens, the 
refugee is no longer an individual fleeing persecution, but 
rather an illegal immigrant who poses as a victim of perse-
cution in order to remain in the country . Kenney also made 
statements indicating that this kind of abuse of the refugee 
system creates a “two-tier immigration system,” which is 
unfair to individuals who wait patiently as their immigra-
tion applications are being processed .
Kenney’s statements in response to the arrival of the 
Ocean Lady echo Macklin’s observation that the discursive 
disappearance of the refugee involves the conceptual dif-
ferentiation between “real refugees” and “illegals .” The “real 
refugee” is conceived as a person who lives somewhere else, 
for example in a refugee camp overseas . Once this person 
crosses a border into a developed country, says Macklin, 
they cease to be a refugee and transform into an “illegal,” 
even though the IRPA explicitly states that refugee claim-
ants are not to be prosecuted for unauthorized entry into 
the country .116 Unlike refugees, “illegals” are transgres-
sors who have no right to enter or remain in the country .117 
Kenney’s statements reflect this discursive transformation 
because they imply that refugee claimants like the Ocean 
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Lady passengers are not “real” refugees, but rather illegal 
immigrants attempting to come through the “back door .”
The discursive disappearance of the refugee is also appar-
ent in the government spokesperson’s statement that refers 
to refugee claimants as “queue jumpers .” Like the “back 
door” comment, this statement suggests that claimants use 
the refugee system as an easy way to immigrate . Moreover, 
it implies that these individuals should not make refugee 
claims but rather wait in the queue for their turn to immi-
grate to Canada . This suggestion is nonsensical because the 
refugee and immigration processes are entirely separate 
systems . In other words, immigrants and refugees are not 
in the same queue . Moreover, as the Minister of State for 
Immigration pointed out in 1986, refugees “cannot wait for 
a number” because they are fleeing persecution . Referring 
to claimants as queue jumpers blurs the distinction between 
refugees and immigrants, and shifts the discourse away 
from Canada’s obligation to protect refugees .
Humanitarianism
The theme of humanitarianism relates directly to the issue 
of Canada’s commitment to the cause of refugees . The extent 
to which this theme played out in each of the discourses pro-
vides an indication of the strength of the concept of the refu-
gee at the relevant time . In 1914, the official actors did not 
consider the possibility that the Komagata Maru passengers 
should be admitted on humanitarian grounds . Given that 
the incident took place several decades before the Refugee 
Convention came into existence, the legal regime did not 
contemplate doing so . Furthermore, the racist immigration 
policies of the day justified their exclusion, and apparently 
enjoyed the support of non-Asian members of the Canadian 
public .
As I explained at the outset of this paper, I decided to 
include a discussion of the Komagata Maru incident in order 
to provide a picture of Canada’s reception of asylum seek-
ers prior to the coming into force of the Refugee Convention . 
This picture, compared to the situation in 1986, provides a 
remarkable contrast . In 1986, the issue of humanitarianism 
dominated the official discourse surrounding the arrival of 
the Tamil asylum seekers . Although officials gave credence to 
concerns about security and the integrity of the immigration 
system, they strenuously defended Canada’s legal and moral 
obligation to protect those fleeing from persecution .
Compared to 1986, the issue of humanitarianism is strik-
ingly absent from the official discourse in 2009 . Concerns 
about security and threats to the integrity of the immi-
gration system came to the fore . None of the official state-
ments that I found in the media and parliamentary debates 
included an explicit reference to the importance of uphold-
ing Canada’s humanitarian tradition .
Conclusion
Overall, the materials that I have reviewed in this paper sup-
port Macklin’s theory of the discursive disappearance of the 
refugee . The three selected incidents trace the emergence and 
decline of the notion of the refugee in Canadian official dis-
course . In 1914, Canadian officials communicated no con-
cern for the possibility that the Komagata Maru passengers 
were in need of protection, and the idea of allowing them 
to remain in Canada on humanitarian grounds was not 
entertained . In 1986, by contrast, the issue of humanitarian 
and Canada’s moral and legal obligation to protect refugees 
became public officials’ dominant concern . The 2009 inci-
dent reflected yet another shift in the discourse . Although 
the Ocean Lady passengers were legally entitled to make 
refugee claims, the theme of humanitarianism was almost 
entirely eliminated from the discourse and public officials 
branded the claimants as illegal migrants . As in 1914, the 
officials in 2009 focused on concerns about security and the 
integrity of the immigration system . Canada’s dedication to 
the Refugee Convention, which appeared so strong in 1986, 
became a mere footnote in the discourse .
This process of the rise and fall of the concept of the refu-
gee, however, was not entirely clear-cut . As I discussed in 
Part II, although humanitarianism dominated the discourse 
in 1986, officials also expressed concerns about security and 
the integrity of the immigration system . Public officials 
referred to asylum seekers as possible security threats and 
spoke of the need to prevent foreigners from “jumping to 
the head of the line” by taking advantage of the refugee sys-
tem .118 For this reason, it is perhaps inaccurate to regard the 
disappearance of the refugee as only a recent phenomenon . 
Even during the heyday of Canada’s refugee policy, the idea 
that an asylum seeker may just be an economic migrant in 
disguise was already apparent in the official discourse . In 
this sense, it appears that the concept of the refugee has 
always been vulnerable to the nullifying discourse of the 
illegal migrant . What we see in 2009 is merely the intensifi-
cation of the discursive disappearance of the refugee, which is 
a process that has been in place for some time .
Procedurally, Canada continues to uphold its obligation 
to process refugee claims to determine whether or not indi-
viduals have a well-founded fear of persecution . However, 
the recent shift in the official discourse is cause for concern 
as it conveys a decline in political commitment to main-
taining this robust process . Indeed, the current government 
has recently introduced an overhaul of the refugee deter-
mination process aimed at making the system more effi-
cient and less vulnerable to abuse .119 Given the context of 
the shift in rhetoric, this legislative change recalls Macklin’s 
warning that the discursive erasure of the refugee could 
serve as a “preparatory step toward legitimating actual laws 
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and practices that attempt to make them vanish in real-
ity .”120 Although the potential impact of the new procedures 
remains uncertain, Macklin’s bleak prediction may prove to 
be apt . With reports of another ship carrying asylum seek-
ers heading for Canadian shores, it appears that Canada’s 
commitment to the Refugee Convention may be tested once 
again .121
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